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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS L. EPTING, II, 
and AMY LYN EPTING, by : 
and through their general 
guardian, : 
C a s e No . 
P l a i n t i f f s - A p p e l l a n t s , : 14.185 
- v s - : 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
D e f e n d a n t - R e s p o n d e n t . : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
T h i s i s an a c t i o n b y t h e m i n o r c h i l d r e n o f C y n t h i a 
E p t i n g M i t c h e l l f o r h e r w r o n g f u l d e a t h c a u s e d b y M i c h a e l H a r t , 
a n e s c a p e d p r i s o n e r f rom t h e U t a h S t a t e P r i s o n . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s 
on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t p l a i n t i f f s ' c l a i m w a s b a r r e d by t h e U t a h 
G o v e r n m e n t a l I m m u n i t y A c t . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
R e s p o n d e n t r e q u e s t s t h a t t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g 
d e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s b e a f f i r m e d . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
R e s p o n d e n t c o n c u r s w i t h t h e f a c t s a s p r e s e n t e d i n 
A p p e l l a n t s ' S t a t e m e n t o f t h e F a c t s s i n c e , f o r t h e p u r p o s e s 
o f t h i s a p p e a l , s a i d f a c t s a r e n o t i n d i s p u t e . 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL -
R e s p o n d e n t s u b m i t s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t 
e r r i n g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s s i n c e , a s a 
m a t t e r o f l a w , t h e S t a t e o f U t a h i s immune f rom t h e a l l e g a -
t i o n s o f n e g l i g e n c e a s s e r t e d i n t h i s s u i t . S a i d c l a i m o f 
i m m u n i t y i s b a s e d on S e c t i o n s 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( 1 0 ) a n d 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( 1 ) 
o f t h e U t a h G o v e r n m e n t a l I m m u n i t y A c t . 
POINT I 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT SHOULD BE 
CONSTRUED SO AS TO PRESERVE ITS INTENDED PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. 
U t a h Code A n n . § 6 3 - 3 0 - 3 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , w h i c h r e a d s : 
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"Except a s may b e o t h e r w i s e 
p r o v i d e d in t h i s a c t , a l l g o v e r n m e n t a l 
e n t i t i e s s h a l l be immune from s u i t for 
any i n j u r y which may r e s u l t from t h e 
a c t i v i t i e s o f s a i d e n t i t i e s w h e r e i n s a i d 
e n t i t y i s engaged in t h e e x e r c i s e and 
d i s c h a r g e of a g o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n . " 
i s a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t o f U t a h ' s 
Governmenta l Immunity Act i s t o r e a f f i r m t h e common law d o c t r i n e 
of s o v e r e i g n immuni ty . The Act c o n t a i n s a s t r o n g p r e s u m p t i o n 
i n f a v o r o f r e t a i n i n g s o v e r e i g n immunity a b s e n t a c l e a r wa ive r 
of immunity w i t h i n t h e Act i s e l f . The Utah Supreme Cour t up he lc 
t h i s s t a n d a r d of j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e Act i n Ho l t v . 
Utah S t a t e Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4 , 511 P .2d 1286 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 
where in t h e C o u r t h e l d : 
" S e c . 6 3 - 3 0 - 3 of t h e Act e x p r e s s l y 
p r o v i d e s fo r t h e c o n t i n u a n c e o f s o v e r e i g n 
immuni ty 'Excep t a s may be o t h e r w i s e 
p r o v i d e d i n t h i s a c t . . . f o r any i n j u r y 
which may r e s u l t from . . . t h e e x e r c i s e 
o f a g o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n . ' T h i s seems 
t o i n d i c a t e an i n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e a c t b e 
s t r i c t l y a p p l i e d t o p r e s e r v e s o v e r e i g n 
immuni ty ; and t o wa ive i t o n l y a s c l e a r l y 
e x p r e s s e d t h e r e i n . " (Emphasis a d d e d . ) 
As a p p e l l a n t s have i n d i c a t e d i n P o i n t I I I of t h e i r 
B r i e f , s t a t u t e s s h o u l d be c o n s t r u e d so a s t o g i v e e f f e c t to t h e 
- 3 -
legislative intent and objectives. Thus, the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act should be construed to give effect to its presumpt: 
of retaining sovereign immunity. 
In ruling on the standard for judicial interpretation 
of state sovereign immunity statutes, the courts have consistent 
construed them strictly so as not to further derogate the state1 
sovereign immunity nor enlarge the privilege the state has grant 
to be sued. 
In Lively v. City of Black foot, 91 Idaho 80, 416. P.2d 
27 (1966), the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
"The general rule of construction 
oft stated and specifically required by 
this court is that a statute authorizing 
suit against a state or political subdi-
vision thereof is in derogation of 
sovereignty and therefore must be strictly 
construed. . . Where the statutory provision 
cannot be said to directly support the 
extended waiver urged by appellant, this 
court cannot judiciously adopt that broad 
construction which appellant urges." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Further, the Kansas Supreme Court in Williams v. Boarc 
of County Commissioners of Rice County, 192 Kan. 548, 389 P.2d 
795 (1964), stated: 
-4-
"I t has been held tha t the consent 
of the s t a t e to be sued, as expressed by 
an act of the leg is l a t u r e , should be 
s t r i c t l y construed so as not to enlarge 
by jud ic i a l in te rp re ta t ion the pr iv i lege 
granted," (Emphasis added.) 
See also Schrader v. Veatch, 216 Or. 105, 337 P.2d 814 (1959); 
Harrison v. Wyoming Liguor Commission, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 
397 (1947); and Los Angeles County v . Riley, 20 Cal.2d 599, 
128 P.2d 537 (1942) . To adhere to the pos i t ion maintained by 
appel lants would be to derogate Utah's Sovereign Immunity and 
enlarge the pr ivi lege i t has granted to be sued. 
In addit ion to the above provision of the Utah Code 
and the c i ted case law, there i s strong public policy for 
j ud i c i a l l y in te rpre t ing the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
favoring a presumption of sovereign immunity. The modern t rend 
in correct ions i s to r e h a b i l i t a t e inmates through vocational 
and educational t ra in ing programs. Work re lease , school re leas 
home v i s i t s , probation and parole are current methods used in 
r e h a b i l i t a t i n g inmates. I t i s a p r a c t i c a l impossibi l i ty to 
provide twenty-four hour guard supervision of inmates on such 
programs. Thus, i f governmental immunity i s not applied to 
protect these programs, there i s a l ikel ihood tha t the programs 
wi l l have to be discontinued. Secondly, the purpose of the 
sovereign immunity doctrine is to free government employees 
from the fear of retaliation so as to allow them to function 
freely and give independent discharge of their duties, and to 
enable the government to attract highly skilled employees who 
otherwise would not accept government employment due to the 
potential liability. This position was clearly stated in 
Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968), where: 
the Utah Supreme Court said: 
"On the other side of this proposi-
tion is the imperative need for those in 
a supervisory capacity to have reasonable 
freedom to discharge the burdensome 
responsibilities of keeping in confine-
ment and maintaining discipline of a large 
number of men who have been convicted of 
serious crime. If such officials are too 
vulnerable to lawsuits for anything untoward 
which may happen to inmates a number of evils 
follow, including a breakdown of discipline 
and the fact that capable persons would be 
discouraged from taking such public positions." 
The purpose and legislative intent of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act would be seriously jeopardized if this 
Court were to interpret said Act in the manner suggested by 
appellants. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS1 CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE OUT OF AN 
INCARCERATION AND THE STATE OF UTAH IS THEREFORE IMMUNE 
FROM LIABILITY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(10) (1953) . 
As indicated in Point I, the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act should be judicially construed so as to preserve. 
the presumption of sovereign immunity intended by the legislatur 
Utilizing this strict standard of construction, an 
examination must be made of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(10) . 
That statute provides as follows: 
"Immunity from suit of all govern-
mental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act 
or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of his employment 
except if the injury: 
(10) arises out of the incarcera-
tion of any person in any state prison, 
county or city jail or other place of 
legal confinement. . . . " (Emphasis 
added.) 
Respondent submits that the language of Subsection (10) is 
clear on its face and was intended to preclude suits against 
the state in situations such as the present case. In the 
alternative, respondent submits that the meaning of the terms 
"ar ises out of," " incarcera t ion;" and other place of legal 
confinement" must be s t r i c t l y construed by t h i s Court with 
a presumption in favor of preserving governmental immunity. 
I t i s undisputed that on the day in question, 
October 10, 1974, Michael Hart was an inmate of the Utah 
State Prison. He was also an inmate who had been granted 
work re lease p r iv i l eges . I t i s also undisputed tha t inmate 
Hart escaped from his work re lease assignment on October 10, 
1974, and murdered the decedent. Appellants are now attempting 
to sue the s t a t e for al leged negligent ac t s committed by prison 
o f f i c i a l s in t h e i r handling of Michael Har t ' s case, including 
decisions made while Hart was on the work re lease program and 
decisions made regarding the escape of the inmate. Respondent 
submits that assuming (for purposes of t h i s appeal only) tha t 
negligent ac ts did occur, the acts would necessar i ly have had 
to have arisen out of Mr. Har t ' s incarcera t ion at the p r i son . 
If Hart had not been an inmate there could have been no negligen 
conduct in r e l a t i on to him. Thus, the al leged negligent conduct 
of prison o f f i c i a l s which gave r i s e to p l a i n t i f f s ' cause of 
act ion, "ar ises out of the incarcerat ion" of inmate Hart. 
Appellants maintain that Emery v. State/ 26 Utah 2d 1 
483 P.2d 1296 (1971), and Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 
445 P.2d 367 (1968), imply that the Section 63-30-10(10) immunii 
only applies where the person injured is the one incarcerated. 
Such a conclusion not only requires a strained interpretation OJ 
the two cases, but also requires this Court to ignore the strici 
standard of construction in favor of immunity which must be 
applied to provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Sheffield and Emery were cases where the plaintiffs 
happened to be the persons confined. Thus, the dictum in 
Sheffield focused on Section 63-30-10(10) as it related to 
plaintiffs who were incarcerated. The dictum understandably 
did not address situations where a plaintiff is not the person 
incarcerated because that was not the fact situation or issue 
facing the court. The Court in Sheffield and Emery did not 
hold or even "imply" that the immunity of Section 63-30-10(10) 
does not apply to plaintiffs who are not incarcerated.. 
The Court in Sheffield merely held that Section 
63-30-10(10), provides immunity for prison officials in 
situations where inmates sue for injuries. The sole issue in 
Emery was w h e t h e r t h e immunity e x t e n d e d t o h o s p i t a l s e t t i n g s 
r a t h e r t h a n p e n a l s e t t i n g s , and w h e t h e r a " v o l u n t a r y " p a t i e n t 
a t a h o s p i t a l was under " l e g a l c o n f i n e m e n t " as d e s c r i b e d in 
S e c t i o n 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( 1 0 ) . The h o l d i n g s of t h e c a s e s had n o t h i n g 
t o do w i t h whe the r S e c t i o n 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( 1 0 ) immunity a l s o a p p l i e d 
t o s i t u a t i o n s where a p l a i n t i f f i s n o t i n c a r c e r a t e d . 
The i n t e n t of S e c t i o n 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( 1 0 ) becomes more c l e a r 
by examin ing s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n s of s o v e r e i g n immunity a c t s of 
o t h e r s t a t e s . For e x a m p l e , G a l . Code A n n . , Government , §§ 
8 4 4 . 6 and 8 4 5 . 8 ( 1 9 7 0 ) , p r o v i d e s : 
" ( a ) N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g any o t h e r 
p r o v i s i o n of t h i s p a r t , . . . a p u b l i c . 
e n t i t y i s n o t l i a b l e f o r : 
(1) An i n j u r y p r o x i m a t e l y c a u s e d 
by any p r i s o n e r , 
(2) An i n j u r y t o any p r i s o n e r , a n d . . . 
N e i t h e r a p u b l i c e n t i t y nor a p u b l i c employee 
i s l i a b l e f o r : 
(b) Any i n j u r y c a u s e d b y : 
(1) An e s c a p i n g or e s c a p e d 
p r i s o n e r . " 
1 1 1 . Rev . s t a t u t e s , Chap . 85 § 4 -106 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , r e a d s : 
" N e i t h e r a l o c a l p u b l i c e n t i t y nor a 
p u b l i c employee i s l i a b l e f o r : 
(a) Any i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from d e t e r -
min ing t o p a r o l e o r r e l e a s e a p r i s o n e r , t o 
r e v o k e h i s p a r o l e or r e l a s e , or t h e t e r m s 
o r c o n d i t i o n s o f h i s p a r o l e . 
- 1 0 -
(b) Any i n j u r y i n f l i c t e d by an 
e s c a p e d or e s c a p i n g p r i s o n e r . " 
The c l e a r meaning of S e c t i o n 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( 1 0 ) , 
e s p e c i a l l y in l i g h t of c o n s t r u i n g t h e Utah Governmen ta l 
Immunity Act so a s t o p r e s e r v e s o v e r e i g n immunity a s p e r 
P o i n t I , s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t s r e s p o n d e n t ' s p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e 
s t a t e i s immune from t h e t y p e of s u i t p r e s e n t e d by t h e i n s t a n t 
c a s e . 
S e c o n d l y , t h e f a c t t h a t H a r t was on a work r e l e a s e 
program and was an e s c a p e e r a t h e r t h a n p h y s i c a l l y i n c a r c e r a t e d 
w i t h i n t h e w a l l s of t h e p r i s o n a t t h e t i m e of t h e d e c e d e n t ' s 
murder i s n o t c r i t i c a l , s i n c e Mr. Ha r t r e m a i n e d i n l e g a l 
c u s t o d y and h i s a c t i o n s t h e r e f o r e a r o s e o u t of t h a t l e g a l 
c o n f i n e m e n t . Numerous j u r i s d i c t i o n s c o n s i d e r work r e l e a s e 
i n m a t e s t o b e i n " c o n s t r u c t i v e c u s t o d y " of the p r i s o n w h i l e 
a c t u a l l y engaged i n t h e i r work o u t s i d e p r i s o n w a l l s . I n Sta t e 
v . Coleman, 24 N.C.App. 530, 211 S .E .2d 542 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , t h e 
d e f e n d a n t , a p r i s o n e r w i t h i n the Nor th C a r o l i n a Depar tment of 
C o r r e c t i o n s and who had been a s s i g n e d t o work w i t h t h e S t a t e 
Highway Commission, was c h a r g e d w i t h e s c a p e from the S t a t e P r i s e 
- 1 1 -
The Cour t i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t u s was s t i l l 
t h a t of b e i n g " i n c a r c e r a t e d " by s t a t i n g : 
"The e v i d e n c e showed he e s c a p e d 
w h i l e a s s i g n e d by an o f f i c i a l of t h e 
Depar tmen t of C o r r e c t i o n s t o work under 
an employee o f t h e S t a t e Highway Com-
m i s s i o n . T h i s c o n s t i t u t e d an e s c a p e 
from t h e S t a t e P r i s o n S y s t e m . " . 
I n S t a t e v . Walke r , 131 N . J . S u p e r . 547 , 330 A.2d 634 
( 1 9 7 4 ) , t h e Cour t h e l d t h a t an inma te p l a c e d on a work r e l e a s e 
program was s t i l l c o n s i d e r e d t o b e i n t h e " c u s t o d y or c o n t r o l 
of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n " even though no t a c t u a l l y w i t h i n i t s w a l l s . 
On t h e same i s s u e of inmate s t a t u s , t h e C o u r t i n 
Wa l l ace v . S t a t e , O k l a . _, 529 P .2d 548 ( 1 9 7 4 ) , s t a t e d : 
"We h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t 
an inmate o r t r u s t y o f t h e s t a t e p e n i -
t e n t i a r y o r r e f o r m a t o r y i s c o n s t r u c t i v e l y 
an i n m a t e t h e r e o f w h i l e i n a n o t h e r 
i n s t i t u t i o n o r on a work a s s i g n m e n t i n 
any c o u n t y of t.he s t a t e . " 
I n S t a t e v . K i g g i n s , 86 S.D. 612 , 200 N.W.2d 243 
( 1 9 7 2 ) , t h e d e f e n d a n t had f a i l e d t o r e t u r n from a work r e l e a s e 
a s s i g n m e n t t o h i s p l a c e of con f inemen t and was c h a r g e d w i t h 
e s c a p e . As t o h i s s t a t u s t h e South Dakota Supreme Cour t s t a t e d : 
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"Defendan t was l a w f u l l y c o n f i n e d 
i n t h e Minnehaha County J a i l . The 
p r i v i l e g e of w o r k - r e l e a s e m e r e l y e x t e n d e d 
t h e l i m i t s of h i s c o n f i n e m e n t . U n t i l h i s 
d i s c h a r g e by due p r o c e s s of law he r ema ined 
under t h e l e g a l r e s t r a i n t of h i s s e n t e n c e 
and i n c o n s t r u c t i v e c u s t o d y of t h e j a i l . " 
200 N.W.2d a t 2 4 4 . 
I n S t a t e v . Brown, 8 Wash.App. 639 , 509 P . 2 d 77 (1973) , 
t h e Wash ing ton Supreme Cour t was f a c e d w i t h a work r e l e a s e 
p a r t i c i p a n t who f a i l e d t o r e t u r n t o a ha l fway house from h i s wor} 
a s s i g n m e n t . As t o d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n in t h e e y e s o f t h e law, 
t h e Cour t s t a t e d : 
"Kropp was l a w f u l l y c o n f i n e d i n t h e 
Ronald H a l l Halfway House . The p r i v i l e g e 
of work r e l e a s e mere ly e x t e n d e d t h e l i m i t s 
of h i s c o n f i n e m e n t . U n t i l h i s d i s c h a r g e 
he r e m a i n e d u n d e r t h e l e g a l r e s t r a i n t of 
h i s s e n t e n c e and i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i v e 
c u s t o d y o f Monroe R e f o r m a t o r y . " 509 P .2d 
a t 7 9 . 
The above h o l d i n g s a r e i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n s 
of o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s which have p a s s e d upon t h e q u e s t i o n of 
t h e s t a t u s of work r e l e a s e p a r t i c i p a n t s . See S t a t e v . F u r l o n g , 
110 R . I . 174, 291 A.2d 267 (1972) ; P e o p l e -v. H a s k i n s , 177 Ca l .App 
2d 84, 2 Cal.Rptr. 34 (1960) ; Lacey v. State, Tenn. , 
506 S.W.2d 809 (1974); McCullough v. United States, 369 F.2d 
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548 (8th Cir. 1966); Hogan v. Arizona Board of Pardons and 
Paroles, 108 Ariz. 472, 501 P.2d 944 (1972). 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the same 
legal principles in Read v. United States, 361 F.2d 830 (9th 
Cir. 1966), when they stated: 
"A person may still be in custody 
even though not under constant super-
vision by guards, so long as some 
restraint remains upon complete freedom." 
Accord: United States v. Rudinsky, 439 
F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1971) . 
The language of work release statutes in some states 
also impllesa continued custody of the prison: 
"If any inmate in the status of a 
day work permittee leaves his place of 
employment, or, having been ordered by 
the commissioner to return to the prison 
or institution, as the case may be, 
neglects or refuses to do so, he shall 
be held to have escaped said prison or 
institution. . . ." Laws of Massachusetts, 
Ch. 127 sec. 86E (1970). 
Other examples of the above provision may be found 
in the Maryland Work Release Law, art. 27, sec. 700a (1966), 
and the Consolidated Laws of New York, art. 26 of Criminal 
Law (1969) . 
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The above concept of l ega l custody also pervades 
Utah's notion of probationers and parolees which f a l l into 
a s imi lar category with work r e l ea see s . Utah Code Ann. § 
77-62-16 (1953), provides: 
"All prisoners released on parole . 
. . . shall remain in the legal custody 
and under the control of the chief adult 
parole and adult probation officer, and 
shall be subject at any time to be retaken 
to the institution from which he was 
paroled. . . . " 
In McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945), the 
Utah Supreme Court explained the meaning of Section 77-62-16 
as follows: 
"From the above provisions, it is 
clear that a parole is in the nature of 
a grant of partial liberty or a lessen-
ing of restrictions to a convicted 
prisoner . Granting of a parole does not 
change the status of a prisoner: it 
merely 'pushes back the prison walls1 
and allows him the wider freedom of 
movement while serving his sentence. 
The paroledprisoner is legally in 
custody the same as the prisoner 
allowed the liberty of the prison yard, 
or of working on the prison farm. The 
realm in which he serves has been extended. 
He is in the custody of the state and 
serving his sentence outside of the 
prison rather than within the walls. 
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The p a r o l e sy s t em i s r e f o r m a t o r y 
and founded upon a p l a n and p o l i c y 
of h e l p i n g t h e i n m a t e t o g a i n s t r e n g t h 
and r e s i s t a n c e t o t e m p t a t i o n , t o b u i l d 
up h i s s e l f c o n t r o l , t o a d j u s t h i s 
a t t i t u d e s and a c t i o n s t o s o c i a l c o n t r o l s 
and s t a n d a r d s ; and i t a ims t o e x t e n d 
h i s l i b e r t i e s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r 
normal l i v i n g w i t h i n t h e s o c i a l f a b r i c 
a s h i s s t r e n g t h t o meet new r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t i e s grows and d e v e l o p s . " (Emphasis 
a d d e d . ) 
In Reeves v . T u r n e r , 28 Utah 2d 310 , 501 P .2d 1212 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , t h e 
Cour t r e a f f i r m e d McCoy as f o l l o w s : 
11
 In McCoy v . H a r r i s , t h i s c o u r t 
c i t e d t h e f o r e g o i n g s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s 
and s t a t e d t h a t a p a r o l e i s i n t h e n a t u r e 
of a g r a n t o f p a r t i a l l i b e r t y o r a l e s s e n -
i n g of r e s t r i c t i o n s t o a c o n v i c t e d p r i s o n e r . 
The g r a n t i n g o f p a r o l e does no t change t h e 
s t a t u s of a p r i s o n e r : he i s l e g a l l y i n 
c u s t o d y t h e same a s t h e p r i s o n e r a l l o w e d 
t h e l i b e r t y of t h e p r i s o n y a r d or vvorking 
on t h e p r i s o n f a rm. U n t i l t h e p a r o l e e ' s 
s e n t e n c e i s t e r m i n a t e d , t he judgment 
commi t t ing him t o t h e c u s t o d y of t h e 
p r i s o n a u t h o r i t i e s i s s t i l l in e f f e c t . 
The p a r o l e e i s s t i l l in c u s t o d i a l e g i s , 
and t h e r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s for t h e 
conduc t of a p a r o l e d p r i s o n e r a r e r u l e s 
and r e g u l a t i o n s for c o n t r o l o f p r i s o n e r s . 
V i o l a t i o n o f such r u l e s i s s i m i l a r t o v i o -
l a t i o n of r u l e s w i t h i n the p r i s o n , and 
c o n s t i t u t e s an abuse of a p r i v i l e g e f o r 
which the p r i v i l e g e may b e w i t h d r a w n . " 
(Emphasis a d d e d . ) 
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B a s e d on t h e h o l d i n g s o f t h e a b o v e c a s e s , a n d t h e 
c a s e s a n d s t a t u t e s o f o t h e r s t a t e s , i t s h o u l d be c l e a r 
t h a t a p r i s o n ' s w o r k r e l e a s e p r o g r a m s i m p l y " p u s h e s b a c k 
t h e p r i s o n w a l l s " i n t o t h e c o m m u n i t y and an i n m a t e ' s 
s t a t u s a s a p r i s o n e r d o e s n o t c h a n g e s i n c e h e i s s t i l l i n 
c u s t o d i a 1 e g i s o f t h e s t a t e . T h u s , s i n c e H a r t r e m a i n e d i n 
l e g a l c u s t o d y h i s a c t i o n s s t i l l " a r o s e o u t o f an i n c a r c e r a t i o n 
o r l e g a l c o n f i n e m e n t " i n c o n f o r m a n c e w i t h S e c t i o n 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( 1 0 ) , 
and t h e S t a t e r e m a i n s immune f rom s u i t . 
POINT I I I 
RESPONDENT WAS ACTING WITHIN I T S DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION AS PER UTAH CODE ANN. § 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( 1 ) ( 1 9 5 3 ) , AND 
THEREFORE I S IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT. 
R e s p o n d e n t s u b m i t s t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n s of U t a h Code 
A n n . § 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( 1 ) ( 1 9 5 3 ) , w h i c h r e a d in p a r t : 
" I m m u n i t y f rom s u i t o f a l l 
g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s i s w a i v e d 
f o r i n j u r y p r o x i m a t e l y c a u s e d b y a 
n e g l i g e n t a c t o r o m i s s i o n of a n 
e m p l o y e e c o m m i t t e d w i t h i n t h e s c o p e 
o f h i s e m p l o y m e n t e x c e p t i f t h e i n j u r y : 
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(1) a r i s e s ou t of t h e e x e r c i s e 
or p e r f o r m a n c e or t h e f a i l u r e t o 
e x e r c i s e o r p e r f o r m a d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
f u n c t i o n / whe the r or n o t t h e d i s c r e -
t i o n i s a b u s e d . . . . " (Emphasis 
a d d e d . ) 
p r o v i d e immunity from t h e t y p e s of a c t i v i t y a l l e g e d by a p p e l l a n t ; 
A p p e l l a n t s concede t h a t t h e above p r o v i s i o n s o f t he Utah 
Governmenta l Immunity Act p r o v i d e immuni ty from s u i t for a c t i o n s 
such a s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of an inmate work r e l e a s e p rogram and 
t h e s e l e c t i o n of s p e c i f i c i n m a t e s t o such a program s i n c e t h e s e 
a c t i o n s c o n c e r n t h e " p l a n n i n g " s t a g e s and a r e t h u s " d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
However, a p p e l l a n t s a l l e g e t h a t : 
" 1 . A w a r d e n ' s d u t y t o c o n t r o l 
and s u p e r v i s e any work r e l e a s e p rog ram, 
so t h a t p r i s o n e r s do n o t harm t h e 
p u b l i c , and 2 . a w a r d e n ' s d u t y t o u s e a l l 
m e a s u r e s t o r e c a p t u r e e s c a p e d p r i s o n e r s , 
a r e ' o p e r a t i o n a l ' o r ' m i n i s t e r i a l ' in 
n a t u r e and t h u s no t e n t i t l e d t o t h e 
' d i s c r e t i o n a r y ' immunity of § 6 3 - 1 0 - 1 0 ( 1 ) . . 
The r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e w i l l depend 
on t h i s C o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e 
term ' d i s c r e t i o n a r y ' . " 
C o u r t s have long r e c o g n i z e d t h e d i f f i c u l t y in d r a w i n g 
d i s t i n c t i o n s be tween " d i s c r e t i o n a r y " and " n o n - d i s c r e t i o n a r y " 
g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t i v i t y . In Smith v . Cooper , 256 O r e . 4 8 5 , 475 
P .2d 78 (1970) , t h e Oregon Supreme Cour t s t a t e d : 
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" I n d e e d d i s t i n c t i o n be tween 
a c t i v i t i e s a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l 
and t h o s e a t t h e p l a n n i n g l e v e l i s 
s u s c e p t i b l e of no g r e a t e r p r e c i s i o n 
i n d e f i n i t i o n t h a n d i s t i n c t i o n 
be tween a c t i v i t i e s which a r e g o v e r n -
m e n t a l and t h o s e which a r e n o n -
g o v e r n m e n t a l o r p r o p r i e t a r y . " 
However, the j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s on t h i s i s s u e have 
been i n f l u e n c e d by t h e p u r p o s e s of t h e s o v e r e i g n immunity 
d o c t r i n e a s m e n t i o n e d i n P o i n t I . Fo r e x a m p l e , i n NeCasek v . 
C i t y o f Los A n g e l e s , 233 C a l . A p p . 2 d 131 ( 1 9 6 5 ) , i t was s a i d : 
" S i n c e o b v i o u s l y no m e c h a n i c a l 
s e p a r a t i o n of a l l a c t i v i t i e s i n which 
p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s may engage a s b e i n g 
e i t h e r d i s c r e t i o n a r y o r m i n i s t e r i a l 
i s p o s s i b l e , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e 
c a t e g o r y i n t o which a p a r t i c u l a r * 
a c t i v i t y f a l l s s h o u l d be g u i d e d by 
t h e p u r p o s e of t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
immunity d o c t r i n e . " (Emphasis a d d e d . ) 
In Garner v . R a t h b u r n , 346 F . 2 d 55 (10 th C i r . 1 9 6 5 ) , t h e Cour t 
d e f i n e d t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n a s b e i n g any a c t i v i t y done 
w i t h i n t h e framework of o f f i c i a l d u t y , " i n v o l v i n g e x e r c i s e o f 
d i s c r e t i o n which p u b l i c p o l i c y r e q u i r e s b e made w i t h o u t f e a r of 
p e r s o n a l l i a b i l i t y . " (Emphasis a d d e d . ) 
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A leading case dealing with the meaning of the word 
"discretion'1 as i t appl ies to sovereign immunity i s Dalehite v . 
United S ta tes , 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953). There, the 
United States Supreme Court, in in te rpre t ing § 2680(a) of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act /_ which in part reads : "any claim 
. . . based upon the exercise or performance of a d iscre t ionary • 
function or duty on the par t of . . . an employee of the Govern-
ment . . ." i s exempt from governmental l i ab i l i t y / ? held tha t 
acts done at the "planning" l eve l were "discret ionary" whereas 
those done at the "operational" level were not . The Court, 
however, went on to specify what type of governmental ac t s 
went in to the "planning" level by s p e c i f i c a l l y holding tha t 
the negligent ac t s in question ( i . e . , f e r t i l i z e r bag label ing, 
determining bag temperature, coating of f e r t i l i z e r , and 
bagging) done by government employees were themselves "planning" 
and thus "discret ionary" since they "involved considerat ions 
more or l e s s important to the p r a c t i c a l i t y of the Government's 
f e r t i l i z e r program" and were pursua nt to the basic plan e s t a b -
l ished by the "Field Di rec to r ' s Office." The Court sa id : 
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 . .' . the discretionary function 
or duty . „ includes more than the 
:i i litiation of programs and activities. 
It also incli ides determinations made by 
executives or administrators in establish-
ing plans, specifications, or schedules 
of operations. Where there is room for 
policy judgment and decision there is 
discretion. It necessari ] y follows that 
acts of subordinates in carrying out the 
operations of government in accordance 
with official directions cannot be 
. . . actionable. If it were not. s^f i. ho 
protection of § 2680(a) would fail at; a 
time it would be needed, that is, when a 
subordinate performs or fails to perform 
a causal step, each action or non-action 
being directed by the supervisor, exercising, 
perhaps abusing, discreti 01 1." I'M at "G „ 
(Emphasis added.) 
D a l e h i t e v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , su p r a , r e p r e s e n t s a 
do t . in i to J i no of o a s e s which tv.jj.il I h a t g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t i v i t y 
which is p u r s u a n t t:o or c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e b a s i c p o l i c y 
" d e c i s i o n s a t i.-u- " p l a n n i n g " l e v e l i s i t s e l f " p l a n n i n g " and 
t h u s w l t l l i n t h e c o n f i n e s o i " d i s c r e t i o n a l ; ^nun-Li, 
Downs v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 382 F . S u p p . 712 C M ; . I'.M.J:. MV ,; . i n 
an a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e U:xii<i. : M , M i,.- M : ,.- »'. <:._-.. . P i . 
Cla im Act a r i s i n g cu.it of an Incident o., a i.r p i r a c y in which 
two . c 'I-!-: v, -•••• : i - i, *-|\: .''r.a. ' J. «.• i.yinn on D a l e h i t e , s u p r a , 
s t a t e d : 
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" D e s p i t e t h e growing c o n v i c t i o n . 
t h a t t h e s o v e r e i g n , J i k e o t h e r s , s h o u l d 
be a c c o u n t a b l e for i t s wrongs , :i t seems . 
c l e a r t h a t t h e conduc t of c e r t a i n t y p e s 
of g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t i v j t y must r e m a i n f r e e 
from t h e e f f e c t s of l i t i g a t i o n . B a s i c a l l y , 
t h e exe mp t io n for d i s c r e t i on a ry fu n c t i on s 
s e e k s t o i n s u l a t e from j u d i c i a l i n q u i r y 
t h e p r o p r i e t y o f b a s i c p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s 
made by o f f i c i a l s of c o o r d i n a t e b r a n c h e s 
of government ii i whoi n. a r e v e s t e d b r o a d and 
p e r v a s i ve de c i s ion-making r e s po ns i b i l i t y . 
The r u l e c o n t e m p l a t e s t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s i n 
which a c o u r t c a n n o t u n d e r t a k e t o d e t e r m i n e 
t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of complex g o v e r n m e n t a l 
d e c i s i o n s , Also , imp] i c i t :i i 1 the c o n c e p t 
of p r o t e c t i o n f o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y a c t s i s 
t h e p r o b a b l e e f f e c t wh ich p o t e n t i a l l i a b i l i t y 
would have in. dampen ii lg t t le a r d o r of t h o s e 
c ha r g ed w i t h t he f or mu la t ion a nd execu t ion 
of g o v e r n m e n t a l p r o g r a m s . The t e s t for 
i m m u n i t y , t h e n , s h o u l d be whe the r i i l j u r y 
i n f l i c t e d a s a r e s u l t o f government r . ^ t l on 
can be s u b j e c t e d t o j u d i c i a l r e v i e w wi.!.iv>ut 
t h e r eby j e o p a r d i z i n g t he qu a .Li ty an d 
e f f i c i e n c y o f government i.l:s«..0. F . 
"Under t h e s e s t a n d a r d s , i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t t h e s u b s t a n c e of any h i j a c k i n g p l a n 
o r p r o c e d u r e f o r m u l a t e d by the Depar tmen t 
o f J u s t i c e t h r o u g h t h e FBI or i t s e x e c u t i v e 
o f f i c i a l s c o u l d n o t be t h e s u b j e c t of 
c i v i l l i t i g a t i o n under t h e T o r t Claims A c t . 
T h i s would be t r u e even though t h e p l a n 
c a l l e d f o r a c t i v i t y c l e a r l y n e g l i g e n t 
ad judged by t r a d i t i o n a l t o r t p r i n c i p l e s . 
Moreover , i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e t h e p u r p o s e s 
for which exempt ion from l i a b i l i t y i s deemed 
n e c e s s a r y , i t i s o b v i o u s ' t h a t a c t s of s u b -
o r d i n a t e s in c a r r y i n g ou t t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f 
_2 2 ~ 
government in accordance with of f ic ia l 
directions cannot be actionable,• Dale-
hite v. United States , supra, 346 U.S. at . ' 
36, 73 S.Ct. at 968. Thus, as urged by the 
Government/ i t is of 110 rea l moment that the 
allegedly negligeiit government agents ; r-
t h i s c a s e w e r e o p e r a t i n g at: t h e ' fio"i»:' 
l e v e l r a t h e r t h a n a L a p o l i c y making ]« . :vol . " • 
( E m p h a s i s a d d e d . ) 
I n M a h l e r v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 3U<> f'. Jd .Ml
 sJ\~d i . M . 
19^21 , i'< .wi . »« ^ hi\)'.«(]: i < i i " l i '> i L i ou S t a l e s l u r • t s 
f a i J u r c t o iiidlio a dc q u a l e Lur.-.ct'L • < > A -IJICI s u p e r v i s i o n o f a 
f e d e r a l ] y fui ided 1: l i g h w a y . ' ' iu: '.j.rr*, t r o n ^ t o f A p p e a l s h e l d th^-* 
t h e g o v e r n m e n t was n o t l i a b l e u n d e r t h e F e d e r a l T o r t C l a i ; . . s A>M 
f o r i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n forrm i l a t i n g t h e p l a i is and s u b s e q u e n t 
a p p r o v a 1 t h e r e o f s i n c e s u e h was a d:i s c r e 1 :i oi i a ry func t i oi i „ C:i t :i I ic 
D a l e h i t e , s u p r a , t h e c o u r t s t a t e d : '• 
"The d i s c r e t i o n a r y t u n c c i o n in :xudes 
m o r e t h a n t h e i n i t i a t i o n of: p r u g r o m s a n d 
. . a c t i v i t i e s . I t a l s o l a c : u d e s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s 
made b y e x e c u t i v e s o r a d m i n i s t r a t o r s iii 
e s t a b l i s h i n g p l a n s , s p e c i f i c a t i o n s o r 
s c h e d u l e s o f o p e r a t i o n s . " 
• I n S u l l i v a n v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 129 F . S u p p . 7] 3 (NMD. 
IJ ] • 1 9 5 5) , i i i a n a c t i on i in der t h e F ed e ra 1 • Tor t C la u n s A c t , t h e 
United States Dis t r ic t Court hula IUJL any ac t iv i ty of a 
government employee at the operational level performed in 
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a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e o f f i c i a l o_Ju/j -,-r p j o o i o m \ j / o • : . t t ;cs 
p e r f o r m a n c e o f a d i s c r e t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n s i n c e i t s s o u r c e 
i s d i s c r e t i o n a r y . 
T h e O r e g o n clour* o f A p p e a l s L n B a k e r v . S t r a u m f j a r d , 
1<' { /• > . •' ; » ' f • . / • 1 -i' • • M •', , ' • ] • . • Ju t h a t a s t a t e e m p l o y e d 
d o c t o r was j Mwiuno u n d e r t h e s t a l e inuauniLy s t a t u t e s i n c e t h e 
f o l l o w i n g a c t s , wl i ic l 1 t he p l a i n t \ f f c o n t e n d e d w e r e t he s o u r c e 
o f l i a b i l i t y , w e r e wi t h i n t h e " c i i s a ^ l " r ^ n ** '• \:\: l.: ••••• : 
- a . A d m i t t i n g p l a i n t i f f l o the s t a t e u n i v e r s i t y 
h o s p i t a l wh e n p J z i i n t :i f f w a s s u f f e r i i 1 g f r o m a m e n t a 3 d i s 11 ir b a nc e , 
a n d 
b . F a i J i n g t o s u p e r v i s e , g u a r d , o r a t t e n d h i m . 
I n
 J a r r e t v . W i l l s , 235 O r e . 5 1 , 383 P . 2 d ^95 ( 1 ^ - J . ) , 
a c a s e s i m i l a r t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e a c t i o n w a s b r o u g h t 
a g a i n s t t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f a home f o r t h e ' m e n t a l ] y d e f d c:i e n t 
a s t h e r e s ' u ] t o f i n j u r i e s i n f l i c t e d on t h e p ] a i n t i f f by a •' . . 
r e s i d e n t on l e a v e . The C o u r t h e l d t h a t b o t h t h e g r a n t i i lg o f 
l e a v e o f a b s e n c e Lo ! h e r e s i d e n t . , a n d t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t ' s f a i l u r e 
t o p r o 1 ' i\ » <Kiceuat..o moans of s a o o r v j s i o n . o v e r t h e r e s i d e n t w h i l e 
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on leave were within the "discretionary" function of tl le 
superintendent. The Court stated: 
"His responsibilities require him 
to make con star it discretionary judgment. 
Like the Board of Parole and Probation 
or the Superintendent of the State 
Hospital,, he is required, as the Stale';-; 
keeper of these unfortunates and in 
:
 behalf of the state, to judge and govern • . 
human beings and human conduct, a ji ldgment 
devoid of any of the standard weights and 
measures available for the decisions made 
by other public officials. There would be 
'•
 -
 - few o L: hi ' . , dt J L M J I I S t h a i wuu ixl noL b e 
d i s c r o l i o n a r y ." 
i n Evainqe .1 t e a 1 LLi \i e> I ±->±_:_l ^L*_ (_il- _iJ^ _yj _j >q_- i„A„r ^_L_J_§/ 
67 Wash . 2d 24(>, 4C / r „ ? d ^4-i (i ^ . o ] , .. h-- p l a i n l i J L b r o u q l i ! an 
a;: ( J O ,
 t ;.• • • < * ' r , .: . v " ^-^1" ; 'or I n - s c :»ss o f i t s cl l u r c h 
v .h ich \'ir, d e s t r o y e d i n .J J . . r e o c t by a boy wno e s c a p e d f rom a 
v.. r (a ' ,< i ; ' , : t.,i l e j u v n n i l e c o r r e c t i o n f a c i l i t y . The 
e s c a p e e had b e e n a s s i g n e d t o a n " o p e n p r o g r a m " w h e r e t h e 
. s e c u r i t y m e a s u r e s w e r e v e r y r e l a x e d . • 
I n r e j e c t i n g t h e p l a i n L i f f ' s c o n t c n ' ;^ •:> ''. h-a 
s t a t e was n e g l i g e n t l y l i a b l e f o r ma i nt..i i n.i ng nn " o p e n p r o g r a m " 
a n d a s s i g n i n g t h e e s c a p e e i n sn,:h ;. \ nji-. M^ , i ha W a s h i n q i ; u n 
S u p r e m e C o u r t I: i e l d t h a t t l le s t a t e was e x e r c i s i n g a d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
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f u n c t i o i i :i i i s t r i k i n g t h e p r o p e r b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e r a p y at: id 
sec t i r :i t y . I n t h i s r e g a r d t h e C o u r t s a i d : 
. \ "To t h i s u n a , .„L c- i l lL ' J . IU . -
' .. p l a y t h e e x e r c i s e of e x e c u t i v e 
e x p e r t i s e , e v a l u a t i o n a n d j u d g m e n t 
i n a n a r e a i n v o l v i n g many v a r i a b l e 
human , e m o t i o n a l a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
f a c t o r s a n d a b o u t w h i c h w i d e l y 
. .•' d i v e r g e n t o p i n i o n s c a n a n d do e x i s t . •' • -
The d e c i s i o n s r e q u i r e d a r e n o t uri] i k e 
t h o s e c a l l e d f o r i n t h e l e g i s l a t i v e 
a n d j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s e s o f g o v e r n m e n t 
„ . The d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v e d w e r e , 
w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f n e c e s s a r y 
e x e c u t i v e and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e s s e s 
o f g o v e r n m e n t , p u r e l y d i s c r e t i o n a r y , i f 
n o t i n f a c t q u a s i - j u d i c i a l i n c h a r a c t e r . " 
( E m p h a s i s a d d e d . ) 4 0 7 P . 2 d 4 4 7 . 
In. D o r m e r v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 114 F . S u p p . 4 77 (D. Mo . . . . 
1 9 5 3 ) , Llic U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Cour t . ! ^ i ' J i- • » ' 
c o n s t r u c t i o n and m a i n t e n a n c e of an a p p r o j i h Ci I I w n; m e r e l y a 
forni o f i r n p l e m e n t i i i g t h e f J ood coi i 1 r o ] m e t h o d a p p r o v e d by 
c o n g r e s s and i m p l e m e n t e d b y t h e c o r p o f e n g i n e e r s in t h e e x e r c i s e 
o f i t s . d i s c r e t i ^MIO t y ;.>.'-.v. ••- • r .. ._•'.;•':. •,-;.. :! :• e.i J_ u d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
f u n c t j - n Milder Uiu F e d e r a l r!V,r! c l a i m s A c t . See a l s o Mei J iL l J^ l • 
'. m :< d S t a Los , L^3 ' . . U P P . ''>0n. ,'P r \ D a k o t a , 1.957), w h e r e b o t h 
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d m a i n t e n a n c e o f a d i k e w e r e he J d tc: • b e 
" d . - i s c i - e t i a n a r y " u n d e r t h e F e d e r a l T o r t . C l a i m s A c t . 
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Certain].1.7 t h e establishment: o 1; a program whereby 
inmates are se l ec ted i.o ;< at: l:i cipa tr i.n n work re lease p ro j ec t 
f a l l s within Iho "a iserc t i onaryM protectioni of Ut a\i Code Ann. 
§ ^-,--J - ;•' ' . Ti) add i t ion , as the above case law i n d i c a t e s , 
the methods employed by prison s tu : ' .>, ^ s tab i i :d;
 ::h .as 
and procedures in connectioi i witl i 11 le program and :i i 1 
s u pe r vi s i t 1 g and- i n a :i 111" a :i r 1 :i i lg 11 1 e p r o g r a in a r e .1 Ik e w i s e wi t hi n 
the d i sc re t iona ry function s ince such are "important to tl le 
p r a c ' j \n . i. . : .' /:. i.i,. iaan! ' . i.t Imsi c program. The 
act ion taken by ['i.json personnel m supervis ing Mr. Hart whi 1e . 
on wor] v r e lease and j i i secur ing h i s recapture were "acts of 
subordinates in carrying out i_he opt od * >],: ^ •* cj.;*.^ 
accordance with o f f i c i a l d i L eel IJMIS " nnd d:- such were " d i s c r e -
t ionary" and not .-.i i i.onab.1 e . •;.. i • : i ; [ ».- ^ . In I i_i c< i Sia LOS , supra . 
Brief mention should be made of aope l i an t s " content ion 
that a Motion •«- _o.sm LS^ AS innppropri.; ir ihis case since the 
question . JI; whether an ac t is " d i s c r e t ionary" or "operat ional" 
i - - ;,u. '.;t ion of j-j^c'j^. AppeLlants c i t e Barnum v, Sta to
 t ^?. 
VJD S 1. , 2 a j 2 G, -xS'j i ' .Jd o / o ( J. J o /) , as s t a n ding lor L h • } a.\ ; ^ . - i_ -
t i on tha t a "dismissal of a claim i.i.d- *- A^CA) (n) i s appropr ia te 
- 2 7 -
o n l y if: . i t c a n be s a i d t h a t t h e r e i s no s t a t e o f f a c t s which 
t h e p i n ;n 1.-i ;;," c-.'uai p r o v e i n s u p p o r t of e n t i t l i n g him t o 
r e l i e f u n d e r h i s c l a i m . " 
Responden t a g r e e s v.: i I. ] • (.he above: e i Led s t a n d a r d 
fo r Ru le 12 \b) ('-) .->i. iuns ajui .*[ i. I ! rs.:A^ili\t ;. i ha t under t h a t 
s t a n d a r d a Motion to D i s m i s s i s a p p r o p r i a t e -..i LIILS c a s e . For 
purpo;-.1^ i-:' 'i.i..; .j['pi.\].L, r r spondem. '-as a g r e e d t o t h e f a c t s a s 
s t a t e o i n a p p e l l a n t s ' b r i e ! t h u s e l i m i n a t i n g any faeJ-un- j a^ r 
F ,f"'l ' i"" '- i. a , a s i s e v i d e n t from t h e above c i t e d c a s e law, 
whether uhc a c t s of the r e s p o n d e n t i n t i n s ca se WLM . " a i s -
c r e t i o n a r y " or " o p e r a t i o n a l " i s a q u e s t i o n of: l a w , ••cspunucnt 
me re ly a rgues t h a t t h e negJ ige r . L -.a; a . . l l e g e d in a p p e l l a n t s ' 
b r i e f and c o m p l a i n t a r e , a s a m a t t e r o f law, d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
f u n c t i o n s „ . 
CONCLUSION 
In cone 1 us L a i , r e s p o n d e n t s u b m i t s t h a t t h e l o w e r 
c o u r t d i d not e r r in d i s m i s s i n g t h i s s u i t on ihe b a s i s of: 
t i ie p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Utah Governmental Immunity A c t . The 
i n c i d e n t i n q u e s t i o n c lea r . I •. -.i-.'-n* , .., . ; • • h '-M: lUMi.v.liL'ii" 
of M i c h a e l H a r t and t h e p r a c t i c e s and p r o c e d u r e s employed 
by p r i s o n o f f i c i a l . : ' ',, a: .-. :•-. i.j.aii j ja i . iid m a i n t a i n i n g a work 
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only i f i t can be sa id tl lat t he re is \u* s t a t e of fsjels which 
the p l a i n t i f f could prove in suppo/L: of." on t i t J. uxj him to 
r e l i e f under h is c la im," ; .' . • • 
Respondent agrees with the above c i t ed s tandard 
for n I* ' • . j/;iio "nd si. .u. ma si La ins t h a t under I: hat 
sLandorcl a "lot ;.u.. Lo bismi^s i s appropr ia te re •. ; is- ^asc [a, »r 
purposes of tl l is appeal , respondenl has agreed to i r e f j j t :J as 
s t a t e d in appe l l an t s 1 b r i e f thus , : • • I ' ;•; ay : <>-< w i tiicpaf-e 
Furthermore! as i s evident from the above e i tea CJSW luV., 
whether the a r i s i f (V "is- ."-ndc.i ' ' M S case were " d i s -
c re t iona ry" • i" " opera t iona L " i s a question of IfHv- Mspoticant 
mi;1"' • y rgues ! s - i i i* J neg l igen t a c t s a l l eged in a p p e l l a n t s ' 
b r i e f and complaint a r e , as a matter of law, ! ; ; . - > > ; ; , i . - y 
f u n c t i a ; ; . • • 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, respondent submits tha t the lower 
court d id not e r r ii i oi.cn is-;., i j this s u i t on ':ho b.:s..s of 
the provis ions of the Utah Governmental. Immunity Act. The 
inexd^a .. ques t '. •-n c lear ry arose out of the " inoarcera t i on" 
of Mi chae l Hart and the p r a c t i c e s ar id procedures cinpi.oyd 
1 >y prisoi i o f f i c i a l s ii i e s t a b l i s h i n g and' ma in t a i l l ing a work 
. . _ 2 8 -
r e l e a s e p r o g r a m a r e i n c l u d e d w i t h i i 1 t h e s t a t e ' s " d i s c r e t i o n a r y " 
f u n c t i o n . 
R e s p o n d e n t r e q u e s t s t h a t t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e l o w e r 
c o u r t • < » f ••!'.*•( i . • 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d / 
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